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THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK
REVIEW MODERNIZATION ACT: THE
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF U.S. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
J. Russell Blakey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Operating behind closed doors, the Committee of Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS or the “Committee”) has
always been somewhat mysterious. For four and a half decades, the
Committee’s sole purpose has been to protect the United States from
foreign investments and transactions with the potential to harm our
nation’s national security. For those four and a half decades, the only
thing that was certain regarding CFIUS’s review and investigatory
process was what kind of investments and transactions it held
jurisdiction over. Those days are now gone.
With the passing and introduction of the Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA or the “Act”), the
Committee’s scope of review has transformed from something solid
and tangible into something unrecognizable with a seemingly
boundless jurisdictional capacity. This seemingly unending
jurisdictional expansion stems from three phrases that lack any
clarifying definition in FIRRMA: “critical infrastructure,” “critical
technologies,” and “sensitive personal data.”1 This Note will unpack
the Committee’s legislative history, analyze the past interpretation of

* J. D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, California
State University, Fullerton, May 2015. I wish to give a special thanks to my family and friends for
their never-ending support during law school and the members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their unparalleled support in pushing this Note through production and the countless
laughs we all shared in the office. Most importantly, I want to thank Professor Therese Maynard,
who not only played an essential role in this Note’s development, but also fostered an amazing
learning environment as both an educator and a mentor. The world is irrefutably a better place
because of Professor Maynard and the joy she brings to teaching.
1. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
§ 1703(a)(4)(B)(iii), 132 Stat. 1636, 2177–83.
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CFIUS’s power and authority to block foreign investments and
transactions, examine how FIRRMA will likely obscure all previously
established notions of which types of future transactions will be
subject to the Committee’s newly expanded reviewing powers, and
ultimately question the likelihood of FIRRMA accomplishing what
Congress designed it to do: protect U.S. national security interests.
II. THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: A (LEGISLATIVE) HISTORY
A. Genesis
On May 7, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order
11858, establishing CFIUS.2 The Committee was originally created to
assist the President with issues found at the crossroads of national
security and foreign investment.3 Pursuant to a Treasury Department
memorandum published soon after the Committee’s formation,
CFIUS was initially established as an inter-agency committee
contained within the Treasury Department, designed to appease
congressional concerns over increased foreign investments into
American portfolio assets (notably Treasury securities, corporate
stocks, and bonds) by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).4 Of course, much of this Congressional sentiment
came as a result of the 1973 Oil Crisis.5
On October 19, 1973, immediately following President
Nixon’s request for Congress to make available $2.2 billion
in emergency aid to Israel for the conflict known as the Yom
Kippur War, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC)6 instituted an oil embargo on the United
2. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2016).
3. Id.
4. Id.; Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/InternationalAffairs/Pages/cfius-index.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010).
5. Michael Corbett, Oil Shock of 1973–74, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74.
6. OPEC and OAPEC are pursuing similar objectives:
[OPEC] was formed in Baghdad in 1960 with 12 member petroleum producing
members including Arab and non-Arab countries. OPEC’s objective is to
coordinate and unify petroleum policies among its member countries, and to
identify best approaches to protect their individual and collective interests. The
Organization seeks the optimal message to secure price stability in global market,
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States (Reich 1995). The embargo ceased US oil imports
from participating OAPEC nations, and began a series of
production cuts that altered the world price of oil. These cuts
nearly quadrupled the price of oil from $2.90 a barrel before
the embargo to $11.65 a barrel in January 1974. In March
1974, amid disagreements within OAPEC on how long to
continue the punishment, the embargo was officially lifted.7
In the wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis, this national security concern
continued to grow as Congress worried that “much of the OPEC
investments were being driven by political, rather than by economic,
motives.”8
Since its inception, the Committee’s primary goal has always
been to monitor foreign investments and their potential implications
on U.S. national security.9 More specifically, CFIUS’s operations
have been statutorily directed, under executive order, to:
(1) arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and
significant developments in foreign investments in the
United States;
(2) provide guidance on arrangements with foreign
governments for advance consultations on prospective major
foreign governmental investments in the United States;
(3) review investments in the United States which, in the
judgment of the Committee, might have major implications
for United States national interests; [and]
(4) consider proposals for new legislation or regulations
relating to foreign investment as may appear necessary.10
As part of these four main statutorily imposed objectives, CFIUS also
engages in a number of other more specific actions including:
(1) obtaining, consolidating, and analyzing information on
foreign investment in the United States;
so as to eliminate address and [sic] unnecessary volatility. The Organization further
endeavors to help member countries boosted [sic] their development plans by
gaining fixed income from their exports. [OAPEC:] [f]rom the list of current
OAPEC members seven are members of OPEC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq,
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Qatar.
Frequently Asked Questions, ORG. ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, http://www.oape
corg.org/Home/FAQs (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
7. Corbett, supra note 5.
8. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 1.
9. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. § 990 (1971–1975).
10. Id.
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(2) improving the procedures for the collection and
dissemination of information on such foreign investment;
(3) the close observing of foreign investment in the United
States;
(4) preparing reports and analyses of trends and of significant
developments in appropriate categories of such investment;
(5) compiling data and preparing evaluation of significant
transactions; and
(6) submitting to the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States appropriate reports, analyses, data, and
recommendations as to how information on foreign
investment can be kept current.11
Although these guiding principles provided a general outline of
the Committee’s purpose and direction, much of CFIUS’s operations
remained in general obscurity.12 “President Ford’s Executive Order
also stipulated that information submitted ‘in confidence shall not be
publicly disclosed’ and that information submitted to CFIUS be used
‘only for the purpose of carrying out the functions and activities’ of
the order.”13 This secrecy continues even today.14 Despite Congress’s
desire for a committee capable of reviewing international investments,
questions arose almost immediately after the Committee’s creation as
to whether it was legally able to collect the information prescribed by
Executive Order 11858.15 In order to reaffirm Congress of the
Committee’s legality, President Ford signed the International
Investment Survey Act in 1976, giving the President the “‘clear and
unambiguous authority’ to collect information on ‘international
investment.’”16
11.
12.
13.
14.

JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 2.
See id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
See Kevin Granville, Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html.
15. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 2.
16. Id. at 2–3; see also International Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 4,
90 Stat. 2059 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3101–3108) (“The President shall, to the extent
he deems necessary and feasible . . . (3) study the adequacy of information, disclosure, and reporting
requirements and procedures relating to international investment; recommend necessary
improvements in information recording, collection, and retrieval and in statistical analysis and
presentation relating to International investment; and report periodically to the Committees on
Foreign Relations and Commerce of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives on national and international developments with respect to laws and regulations
affecting international investment . . . .”).
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By 1980, only five years after the Committee’s creation, some
members of Congress grew frustrated with CFIUS, arguing that it had
failed to accomplish what it was intended to do.17 Those concerns
stemmed from the Committee’s infrequent meetings, meeting only ten
times in its first five years,18 and CFIUS’s narrow focus on the political
implications of foreign investments rather than their overall economic
benefit.19 In response, however, the Committee investigated several
foreign investments in the following years, mostly at the request of the
Department of Defense.20 Several of these investigations were
primarily focused on its most prominent competitor at the time:
Japan.21 As a result, CFIUS saw its first major legislative revision in
1988: the Exon-Florio provision.22
B. The Exon-Florio Provision
The Exon-Florio provision of 1988 provided a substantial
increase in the discretionary authority of the executive branch to take
whatever “action [the President] considers to be ‘appropriate’ to
suspend or prohibit proposed or pending foreign acquisitions, mergers,
or takeovers which ‘threaten to impair the national security.’”23
However, this newly established power came with a catch: in order to
use this power, the President must (1) find that “there is credible
evidence . . . that the foreign interest exercising control might take
action that threatens to impair the national security” and that (2)
“provisions of law . . . do not in the President’s judgment provide
adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect the
national security in the matter before the President.”24 Surprisingly,
“national security” was never specifically defined, but was generally
interpreted in a broad manner.25
17. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and
Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Gov’t Operations H.R., 96th Cong. 5 (1979) (statement of Mary P. Azevedo)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2901–2906) (passage of the Exon-Florio provision).
23. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22863, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CFIUS,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS22863.pdf.
24. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 102 Stat. at 1425–26.
25. JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 2.
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Ironically, just as Executive Order 11858 gave the executive
branch the power to gather information required for CFIUS, the
legislature grew wary of its own decision to push through the ExonFlorio provision, believing “that the United States could not prevent
foreign takeovers of U.S. firms unless the President declared a national
emergency or regulators invoked federal antitrust, environmental, or
securities laws.”26 Additionally, as a result of CFIUS and the ExonFlorio provision, Congress faced the economic challenge of
“balanc[ing] public concerns about the economic impact of certain
types of foreign investment with the nation’s long-standing
international commitment to maintaining an open and receptive
environment for foreign investment.”27
While the political and economic impact of the Exon-Florio
provision remained relatively unclear, the direct implementation,
specifically the time constraints of the provision, left little room for
imagination.28 The provision established a three-step process for
CFIUS’s review of qualifying foreign mergers, acquisition, and
takeovers: (1) “CFIUS has 30 days to conduct a review;” (2) “45 days
to conduct an investigation;” and (3) “then the President has 15 days
to make his determination.”29 Pursuant to this provision, only the
President has the ability to prohibit or bar foreign investments that fall
within the Committee’s reviewing jurisdiction.30
C. The Byrd Amendment
The Committee’s official power and jurisdiction was further
expanded in 1992 as a result of what is commonly referred to as the
Byrd Amendment.31 While the Byrd Amendment did not alter
CFIUS’s original jurisdiction as established by Executive Order
11858, it did act as a supplement to “the Exon-Florio statute through
Section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484,
§ 837(a)–(b), 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–64 (1992).
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Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484),” balancing the President’s new greater
discretionary power with additional hardline rules.32
In response to the Exon-Florio provision giving greater
discretionary power to the President, the Byrd Amendment mandated
that the Committee must investigate and review certain investments,
so long as those investments satisfy two distinct criteria: “(1) the
acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government;
and (2) the acquisition results in control of a person engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national
security of the United States.”33 When these factors were met, the
President’s duty to conduct a review of qualifying investments was
triggered, mandating a compulsory investigation. This new
requirement, however, did not displace the additional short-list of
factors that the Exon-Florio provision provided to the President when
“deciding to block a foreign acquisition,” merger, or takeover.34 This
list included the following elements:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements;
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet
national defense requirements, including the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other
supplies and services;
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and
capacity of the U.S. to meet the requirements of national
security;
(4) the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of
military goods, equipment, or technology to a country that
supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or
chemical and biological weapons; and . . .
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S.
technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national
security.35
32. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33312, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL
SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8 (2013); see also National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(a)–(b), 106 Stat. at 2463–64.
33. JACKSON, EXON-FLORIO, supra note 32, at 8.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.
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As a result of the Byrd Amendment, the Committee experienced its
first noticeable power shift since its inception away from the executive
branch and instead toward the legislature. Congress initiated this shift
not by explicitly removing any authority from the executive branch,
but rather by passing unambiguous legislation determining when a
Committee investigation and review was required, irrespective of the
President’s personal opinion as to its necessity.
D. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
The final alteration to CFIUS’s review process prior to
FIRRMA’s implementation was the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).36 This third amendment to the
Committee’s oversight and the scope of CFIUS review was yet
another example of Congress’s attempt at restructuring and
reorganizing the balance of powers with respect to foreign investment
oversight between Congress and the President. Addressing Congress’s
concern that the Exon-Florio provision limited its own power in favor
of granting the executive with more discretionary oversight
concerning foreign investment, FINSA reasserted congressional
power in two foundational ways:
First, Congress enhanced its oversight capabilities by
requiring greater reporting to Congress by CFIUS on the
Committee’s actions either during or after it completes
reviews and investigations and by increasing reporting
requirements on CFIUS. Second, Congress fundamentally
altered the meaning of national security in the Exxon-Florio
provision by including critical infrastructure and homeland
security as areas of concern comparable to national
security.37
While these two provisions reflect FINSA’s most notable
changes, they were not the only changes the amendment created.
FINSA required the Committee to investigate all transactions “[i]f the
Committee determines that the covered transaction is a foreign
government-controlled transaction,” meaning any “transaction that
36. See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat.
246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170); JAMES J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 16
(2013).
37. JACKSON, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 36, at 16.
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could result in the control of any person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States by a foreign government or an entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government.”38
Additional changes required that the Director of National Intelligence
conduct an independent and “thorough analysis of any threat to the
national security of the United States posed by any covered
transaction.”39 FINSA also provided the Committee and the President
with additional factors to consider during their investigations,
including the subject country’s adherence to nuclear nonproliferation
control regimes (voluntary and nonbinding arrangements designed to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and
diplomatic history in cooperating with the United States in counterterrorism efforts.40
Despite these amendments, congressional attitudes shifted with
an increased sense of criticism regarding both the Exon-Florio
provision and the Committee’s then-current effectiveness. Certain
CFIUS scholars, most notably James K. Jackson, have argued that this
increased criticism of the Exon-Florio provision originated from the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.41 Select members of Congress
criticized the Committee’s “perceived lack of responsiveness,”42 and
in February of 2006, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Strategic Affairs Richard Perle similarly described his disappointment
with CFIUS, stating that “[t]he committee almost never met, and when
it deliberated it was usually at a fairly low bureaucratic level . . . . I
think it’s a bit of a joke [if we were serious about scrutinizing foreign
ownership and foreign control, particularly since September 11.]”43
This shift was most apparent in 2006 following what would come to
be known as the Dubai Ports World Debacle.
1. The Dubai Ports World Debacle
In October 2005, news surfaced over the mainstream media that
Dubai Ports World (“DP World”) was interested in acquiring Britishowned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, or P&O
38. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2, 121 Stat. at 246–52.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 4.
41. JACKSON, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 36, at 6.
42. JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 3.
43. Political Backlash over Port Deal, CBS NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016, 9:11 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/political-backlash-over-port-deal/.
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Ports (“P&O”).44 DP World was and continues to run as a major global
port operator founded as a result of the 2005 merger of Dubai Ports
Authority and Dubai Ports International,45 led by Dubai Sultan Ahmed
bin Sulayem as its CEO.46 After a bidding war with Singapore’s
government-owned Port of Singapore Authority, CFIUS approved DP
World’s $6.8 billion bid for P&O.47 Among P&O’s assets, however,
were container terminals in the ports of Baltimore, Miami, New
Orleans, New York-New Jersey, and Philadelphia,48 sounding the
alarm bell for several members of Congress.49
Democrats like Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York
warned that the port operations could be “infiltrated” by
terrorists exploiting the ownership in Dubai, an emirate
known for its open trade. Dubai had been the transfer point
starting in the late 90’s for nuclear components shipped by
the largest illicit nuclear technology network in the world.50
DP World’s purchase of P&O also drew criticism in the press
because of its potential effect on unsuspecting American businesses.
At the time of DP World’s acquisition of P&O, a subsidiary of Eller
& Co., a Florida cruise line firm,51 was partnered with P&O and was
in the midst of resolving various contract issues.52 Eller & Co.,
however, found itself in a precarious situation: as a result of DP
World’s successful acquisition of P&O, the firm would “become
involuntarily a business partner with the government of Dubai.”53
These concerns, combined with the ever-lingering security interests
that naturally accompany a foreign government’s influence over vital
U.S. ports, only increased congressional anxiety over the DP World-

44. JULIO J. ROTEMBERG, THE DUBAI PORTS WORLD DEBACLE AND ITS AFTERMATH 1
(Harvard Bus. Sch. rev. 2007).
45. Id. at 2.
46. See Board of Directors, DP WORLD, https://www.dpworld.com/who-we-are/leadership
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
47. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 2.
48. Id.
49. See David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-companydrops-port-deal.html.
50. Id.
51. Neil King Jr. & Greg Hitt, Small Florida Firm Sowed Seed of Port Dispute: Eller’s Suits
and Lobbying Lie Behind Dubai Furor; Approval Delayed in U.K., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2006,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114105320594384271.
52. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4.
53. King & Hitt, supra note 51.
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P&O merger. But these concerns, which were previously disregarded
by the Committee, were precisely what provided the legislature with
the traction needed to fight back.
As the DP World deal grew increasingly unpopular and
controversial in the public eye as a result of its national security
implications, bipartisan congressional support grew for the insistence
that the Committee conduct an investigation. “While on a fact-finding
tour of ports, Senate majority leader Bill Frist (Republican,
Tennessee) threatened to pass a law to put the deal on hold unless the
White House initiated a more thorough 45-day CFIUS
‘investigation.’”54 In opposition to Congress’s growing resistance to
the deal, President George W. Bush increased his efforts to sway
Republican Congress members to support the deal, all while
maintaining that the merger posed no threat to American national
security.55 In fact, on February 21, 2006, President Bush released a
statement to the press, stating that “[i]f there was any chance that this
transaction would jeopardize the security of the United States, it would
not go forward.”56
Irrespective of the White House’s support for the deal, what
began as an enticing investment opportunity for DP World had
blossomed into a public relations nightmare and international debate
with the spotlight on DP World. Accordingly, DP World itself
requested a forty-five-day CFIUS investigation in an attempt to calm
any national security concerns and formally legitimize the
transaction.57 At this point, however, lawmakers demanded more,
insisting that the Committee’s report be provided to Congress and that
Congress, not the White House, ultimately decide the final decision of
either approving or barring DP World’s acquisition of P&O.58 As the
resistance to the DP World-P&O merger continued to grow, “[t]he
54. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id.; Fact Sheet: The CFIUS Process and The DP World Transaction, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 22, 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/2006022211.html.
57. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, CFIUS Welcomes Dubai Ports Worlds
Announcement to Submit to New Review (Feb. 26, 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/js4072.aspx.
58. See ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4; see also David E. Sanger, Review of Port Deal Will
Leave Decision to Bush, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/politics/review-of-port-deal-will-leave-decision-tobush.html.
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state-owned Dubai company seeking to manage some terminal
operations at six American ports dropped out of the deal.”59 On
December 11, 2006, DP World sold its U.S. holdings to the American
insurance company, American International Group for an undisclosed
price, finally bringing a bitter conclusion to the DP World debacle.60
E. Modern Chinese Investment
More recently, as economic global powers shift, greater emphasis
and attention has been placed on Chinese investments and the potential
national security threats that come along with those investments. In
2014 and 2015, Chinese investments represented the largest amount
of CFIUS covered investments, with twenty-four and twenty-nine
covered transactions, respectively.61 As Chinese investments
continued to grow, a variety of different congressional committees
began theorizing on how to preempt national security threats by reevaluating CFIUS’s role.
“[O]n October 8, 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence published a report on ‘the counterintelligence and
security threat posed by Chinese telecommunications companies
doing business in the United States.’”62 This report specifically
addressed the potential threat created by the acquisitions, takeovers,
or mergers of American companies by Chinese telecommunication
giants, most notably the Chinese government-owned Huawei and
ZTE.63
But telecommunication transactions by Chinese tech giants like
Huawei and ZTE are not the only manner in which Chinese
investments into the U.S. economy raise potential red flags. Chinese
investments into the U.S. economy and technologies have also
targeted startups through venture capitalist endeavors. Although
59. David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-companydrops-port-deal.html.
60. Heather Timmons, Dubai Port Company Sells Its U.S. Holdings to A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/business/worldbusiness/12ports.html.
61. Memorandum from Latham & Watkins LLP on Overview of the CFIUS Process 4 (2017),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process.
62. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 31 (quoting MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER,
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI
AND ZTE iv (2012), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:rm226yb7473/HuaweiZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf).
63. See id.
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Chinese venture capitalist investments typically reflect private rather
than governmental investment, these investments “still typically target
firms in industries the government has prioritized as strategic, such as
[artificial intelligence (AI)], autonomous vehicles, virtual reality,
robotics, and blockchain technology.”64 According to research by the
Defense Innovation Unit, a United States Department of Defense
initiative, Chinese participation in U.S. venture-backed startups
accounted for between 10 and 16 percent of global venture deals in the
United States between 2015 and 2017 and has increased rapidly since
2010.65 Between 2015 and 2017, China was the largest foreign source
of equity investments in U.S. companies, investing a combined $24
billion in U.S. venture-backed companies, or 13 percent of worldwide
investment in the United States.66 Specifically regarding artificial
intelligence technologies, “while China accounted for only 10% of
global AI deals in 2017, Chinese AI startups took 48% of all AI
funding dollars that year, surpassing the US in AI funding for the first
time.”67 This increase in Chinese investment has also made the U.S.
tech-economy the target of increasing levels of cyber espionage
carried out by, or with the assistance of, the Chinese government.68
According to James Lewis, a senior vice president at the Center for
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Strategic and
International Studies, over the past two decades Chinese cyber
espionage has likely cost the U.S. economy between $20 billion and
$30 billion annually.69 These acts of cyber espionage do not only harm
profit margins for affected intellectual property (IP) owners, but also
pose a far larger theoretical threat to IP creators and the economy: the

64. SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, HOW CHINESE COMPANIES
FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM THE UNITED STATES 6 (2019),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%20Companies%20Facilitate
%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf; see also MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET
SINGH, DEF. INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY:
HOW CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ENABLE A S TRATEGIC COMPETITOR TO
ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 7–8 (2018),
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.
65. BROWN & SINGH, supra note 64, at 2.
66. Id. at 28.
67. China Is Starting to Edge Out the US in AI Investments, CBINSIGHTS (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups-tech/.
68. O’CONNOR, supra note 64, at 8.
69. James Andrew Lewis, How Much Have the Chinese Actually Taken?, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-much-havechinese-actually-taken.
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unlawful access and utilization of “technical data, negotiating
positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications.”70
“For example, in October 2018 the U.S. Department of Justice
indicted an official from China’s Ministry of State Security for
economic espionage and attempting to steal trade secrets from GE
Aviation, a subsidiary of General Electric, and other U.S. aviation and
aerospace companies.”71 While economic threat accompanying the
manipulation or outright theft of emerging technologies and
intellectual property pose a very real and tangible problem, it is the
technology’s use and its underlying information against the United
States that encapsulates the heart of the Committee and its purpose.
Similar issues were identified in a separate report published the
following month by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission.72 This congressionally created commission was
designed to “monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual
report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and
economic relationship between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where
appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.”73
The report explained more fundamentally where the threat lies in
allowing foreign investments. “[S]ome observers argued that
economic concerns focused on the possibility that state-backed
Chinese companies choose to invest ‘based on strategic rather than
market-based considerations,’ and are free from the constraints of
market forces because of generous state subsidies.”74 This concept,
similar to the OPEC transactions of the 1970s, set forth a variety of
potential CFIUS amendments that would address the issue of Chinese
investments and acquisition transactions:
(1) requir[ing] a mandatory review of all controlling
transactions by Chinese state-owned and state-controlled
companies investing in the United States;

70. O’CONNOR, supra note 64, at 9.
71. Id.
72. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2018).
73. U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n—Fact Sheet, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SECURITY
REV. COMMISSION, https://www.uscc.gov/about/fact_sheet (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); see also
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398,
114 Stat. 1654 (2000).
74. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 15.
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(2) add[ing] a net economic benefit test to the existing
national security test that CFIUS administers; and
(3) prohibit[ing] investment[s] in a U.S. industry by a
foreign company whose government prohibits foreign
investment in that same industry.75
Other suggested modifications to CFIUS included expanding its
authority to evaluate and review “‘greenfield’ investments, or
investments in new industrial plants and facilities.”76 Although
Chinese investments remained the most problematic during this
period, the concern over greenfield investments originated from
Russian space agency Roscosmos’s interest in developing six Global
Positioning System monitor stations throughout the United States.77
This proposition was supported by the State Department, which saw it
as potentially strengthening international relations, but was criticized
by the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department, which
feared Russia’s increased ability to spy more effectively on the United
States.78
Although the threat of Chinese investment into the United States
economy has only continued to increase, no amendment to the scope
of the Committee’s authority has ever explicitly addressed the issue
underlying U.S.-Chinese transactions. But this fear nevertheless acted
as the catalyst for the most recent legislative amendment to CFIUS’s
jurisdiction: the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
of 2018.
F. The State of CFIUS and Its “Covered Transactions”
Prior to FIRRMA
Understanding CFIUS’s development, history, and evolving role
over time is essential in distinguishing between its parameters
regarding “covered transactions” prior to the passing of the Act and
after the implementation of FIRRMA. For all “covered transactions,”
or transactions that directly fall under the mandatory review of CFIUS,
the Committee must “determine whether a transaction threatens to
impair the national security, or the foreign entity is controlled by a
foreign government, or it would result in control of any ‘critical
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
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infrastructure that could impair the national security.’”79 Under
FINSA, “a ‘covered’ foreign investment transaction refers to any
merger, acquisition or takeover which results in foreign control of any
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”80
As an inter-agency committee contained within its bounds, the
Treasury Department also makes clear what transactions are not
covered by CFIUS. First and foremost, all transactions that are merely
for investment purposes only, or “an investment in which the foreign
investor has ‘no intention of determining or directing the basic
business decisions of the issuer,’” are affirmatively not transactions
subject to the Committee’s review.81 Title 31 of the Code of Federal
Regulations defines transactions that are solely for investment
purposes by applying a two-part test:
(1) Transaction that result in ownership of 10% or less of the
voting securities of the firm; and
(2) “investments that are undertaken directly by a bank, trust
company, insurance company, investment company, pension
fund, employee benefit plan, mutual fund, finance company,
or brokerage company ‘in the ordinary course of business for
its own account.’”82
Other transactions not covered under CFIUS’s jurisdiction
include: (1) “stock split[s] or pro rata stock dividend[s] that do[] not
involve a change in control;” (2) “acquisition[s] of any part of
an entity or of assets, if such part of an entity or assets do not
constitute a U.S. business;” (3) “acquisition[s] of securities by
a person acting as a securities underwriter, in the ordinary course of
business and in the process of underwriting;” and (4) “an acquisition
pursuant to a condition in a contract of insurance relating to fidelity,
surety, or casualty obligations if the contract was made by an insurer
in the ordinary course of business.”83

79. Id. at 16.
80. Memorandum, Baker Botts L.L.P. and U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program, A Guide
to Demystify the CFIUS Process 5 (last visited June 2, 2020), http://docplayer.net/37687000-Aguide-to-demystify-the-cfius-process-presented-by-baker-botts.html.
81. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 16.
82. Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (a)–(f) (2018) (defining transactions that are not
covered).
83. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (a)–(g) (2018) (defining transactions that are not covered); see also
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 16.
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Conceptually, distinguishing between CFIUS’s covered and noncovered transactions is relatively easy to understand. What tends to
complicate this determination is the more nuanced sub-issue as to what
exactly qualifies as a “controlling” investment—an essential element
for establishing CFIUS’s jurisdiction. While no numerical definition
of “control” is provided by the Committee’s statute, the Treasury
Department’s regulations do provide an expansive list of
considerations that assist the Committee in evaluating how much
“control” various foreign transactions result in.
The term control means the power, direct or indirect, whether
or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a
dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in
an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share,
contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements
to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or
decide important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but
without limitation, to determine, direct, take, reach, or cause
decisions regarding the following matters, or any other
similarly important matters affecting an entity:
(1) The sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of any
of the tangible or intangible principal assets of the entity,
whether or not in the ordinary course of business;
(2) The reorganization, merger, or dissolution of the entity;
(3) The closing, relocation, or substantial alternation of the
production, operational, or research and development
facilities of the entity;
(4) Major expenditures or investments, issuances of equity or
debt, or dividend payments by the entity, or approval of the
operating budget of the entity;
(5) The selection of new business lines or ventures that the
entity will pursue;
(6) The entry into, termination, or non-fulfillment by the
entity of significant contracts;
(7) The policies or procedures of the entity governing the
treatment of non-public technical, financial, or other
proprietary information of the entity;
(8) The appointment or dismissal of officers or senior
managers;
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(9) The appointment or dismissal of employees with access
to sensitive technology or classified U.S. Government
information; or
(10) The amendment of the Articles of Incorporation,
constituent agreement, or other organizational documents of
the entity with respect to the matters described in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (9) of this section.84
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any person holding 5
percent or more of the publicly traded securities of a United States
firm to report the acquisition of the shares to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.85 Similarly, Title 15 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, section 806.15 defines foreign direct investment control
as “the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign
person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an
unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including a branch.”86
Ultimately, while these numbers can help assess the amount of
influence a certain entity maintains over their investment, “control”
nevertheless remains a relatively elusive term that shifts depending on
who the investor is, what the investment covers, and the state of the
current international relationship between the United States and the
investor’s home country. Irrespective of the subjective nature
surrounding “controlling” investments, it still remains the case that
prior to FIRRMA’s 2018 introduction, the Committee only maintained
review and investigation powers over “controlling” foreign
investments.87 This distinction, however, would become irrelevant
with the application of FIRRMA.
III. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2018
The most recent and arguably most revolutionizing expansion to
CFIUS’s reviewing power and jurisdiction came from the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, or FIRRMA.
84. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73
Fed. Reg. 70,702, 70,718 (Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018).
86. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (2012).
87. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed CFIUS Regulations to Implement
FIRRMA 2 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Proposed-FIRRMARegulations-FACT-SHEET.pdf.
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The Act was passed in the Senate on August 1, 2018 and signed into
law by President Donald J. Trump on August 13, 2018, becoming the
first major overhaul to CFIUS operations in over a decade and marking
a new era in regulating foreign investment in the U.S. economy.88
While commonly described as an amendment designed to “close the
gaps” that were previously exploitable under CFIUS’s scope, the
general consensus is that “closing the gaps” is merely a euphemism
for establishing more restrictions specifically targeting Chinese direct
investments into the United States.89
A. FIRRMA Greatly Expands CFIUS’s Jurisdiction
Prior to FIRRMA’s enactment, the Committee’s power to review
certain foreign investments remained contingent on the level of
control the purchaser would possess over the entity following the
transaction: if the investment resulted in the investor receiving
sufficient control of the U.S. entity or business, then CFIUS could
review the transaction, but if it did not, the Committee had no authority
to intervene on the proposed acquisition, merger, or takeover.90
Following FIRRMA, however, the rules of the game had been changed
quite profoundly, expanding the scope of the Committee’s regulatory
review authority to cover both controlling and non-controlling
investments.
Under section 1703 of FIRRMA, “covered transactions” subject
to CFIUS review were expanded to include both controlling and noncontrolling foreign investments, stirring debate concerning the Act’s
general ambiguity as to where the scope of CFIUS’s regulatory review
ends. The new parameters surrounding CFIUS covered transaction are
as follows:
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided, the term
‘covered transaction’ means—
(i) any transaction described in subparagraph (B)(i); and

88. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
§§ 1701–1728, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174–2207.
89. See Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for
Industry, WHITE & CASE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfiusreform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry; Farhad Jalinous et al., How FIRRMA Changed
National Security Reviews in 2018, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1111900/how-firrma-changed-national-security-reviews-in-2018.
90. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 87, at 2.
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(ii) any transaction described in clauses (ii) through (v) of
subparagraph (B) that is proposed, pending, or completed on
or after the effective date set forth in section 1727 of the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of
2018.
(B) TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.—A transaction described
in this subparagraph is any of the following:
(i) Any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or
pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person
that could result in foreign control of any United States
business, including such a merger, acquisition, or takeover
carried out through a joint venture.
(ii) Subject to subparagraphs (C) and (E), the purchase or
lease by, or a concession to, a foreign person of private or
public real estate that—
(I) is located in the United States;
(II)(aa) is, is located within, or will function as part of,
an air or maritime port; or
(bb)(AA) is in close proximity to a United States
military installation or another facility or property of the
United States Government that is sensitive for reasons
relating to national security;
(BB) could reasonably provide the foreign person the
ability to collect intelligence on activities being
conducted at such an installation, facility, or property;
or
(CC) could otherwise expose national security activities
at such an installation, facility, or property to the risk of
foreign surveillance; and
(III) meets such other criteria as the Committee
prescribes by regulation, except that such criteria may
not expand the categories of real estate to which this
clause applies beyond the categories described in
subclause (II).
(iii) Any other investment, subject to regulations prescribed
under subparagraphs (D) and (E), by a foreign person in any
unaffiliated United States business that—
(I) owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services
critical infrastructure;
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(II) produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates,
or develops one or more critical technologies; or
(III) maintains or collects sensitive personal data of
United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner
that threatens national security.91
While much of the covered transactions contained within section
B(i) and B(ii) remained consistent with CFIUS’s earlier jurisdiction
before FIRRMA, the center of the debate focuses on the text of section
(B)(iii). Under this subsection, FIRRMA expands the Committee’s
jurisdiction by opening the door to reviews concerning all
transactions, controlling or non-controlling, that involve “critical
infrastructure,” “critical technologies,” and the “sensitive personal
data” of Americans.92 At first glance, this alteration to the scope of
CFIUS review may seem inconsequential, but this revision to the
Committee’s power has left many asking what these terms mean and
how they will impact the Committee’s review capabilities.93 In order
to comprehend the vast ambiguity surrounding the Committee’s newly
established scope of review, it must first be understood exactly how
FIRRMA defines, or utterly fails to define, “critical infrastructure,”
“critical technologies,” and “sensitive personal data.”
1. “Critical Infrastructure”
“Critical infrastructure,” as defined by the Act, refers to all
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets
would have a debilitating impact on national security.”94 Despite the
fact that this description could feasibly include almost anything
depending on its interpretation, “this wording mirrors the language
used in FINSA and by the Department of Homeland Security to
describe the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors of the U.S.
economy.”95 Those sixteen sectors include:
- Chemical Sector
91. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(4), 132 Stat. at
2177–78 (emphasis added).
92. Id. § (a)(4)(B)(iii).
93. See Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law, supra note 89.
94. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(5), 132 Stat. at
2181.
95. Michael Greshberg & Justin Schenck, The CFIUS Reform Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/26/the-cfiusreform-bill/.
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- Commercial Facilities Sector
- Communications Sector
- Critical Manufacturing Sector
- Dams Sector
- Defense Industrial Base Sector
- Emergency Services Sector
- Energy Sector
- Financial Services Sector
- Food and Agriculture Sector
- Government Facilities Sector
- Healthcare and Public Health Sector
- Information Technology Sector
- Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector
- Transportation Systems Sector
- Water and Wastewater Systems Sector.96
Accordingly, it is likely that much of what will come under CFIUS
review pursuant to FIRRMA will remain unchanged from what it was
during the FINSA era. However, the following two categories,
“critical technologies” and “sensitive personal data,” will prove to be
far more elusive and likely expand the Committee’s jurisdiction
beyond all prior understandings.
2. “Critical Technologies”
The second major category left exposed for CFIUS review
following the passing of FIRRMA is “critical technologies.” The Act
defines “critical technologies” as follows:
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘critical technologies’ means the
following:
(i) Defense articles or defense services included on the
United States Munitions List set forth in the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations under sub-chapter M of chapter
I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.
(ii) Items included on the Commerce Control List set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration
Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations, and controlled—

96. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last updated Mar. 24, 2020).
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(I) pursuant to multilateral regimes, including for
reasons relating to national security, chemical and
biological
weapons
proliferation,
nuclear
nonproliferation, or missile technology; or
(II) for reasons relating to regional stability or
surreptitious listening.
(iii) Specially designed and prepared nuclear equipment,
parts and components, materials, software, and technology
covered by part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations
(relating to assistance to foreign atomic energy activities).
(iv) Nuclear facilities, equipment, and material covered by
part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to
export and import of nuclear equipment and material).
(v) Select agents and toxins covered by part 331 of title 7,
Code of Federal Regulations, part 121 of title 9 of such Code,
or part 73 of title 42 of such Code.
(vi) Emerging and foundational technologies controlled
pursuant to section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act
of 2018.97
The crucial change here was the inclusion of “emerging and
foundational technologies controlled pursuant to section 1858 of the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018” (ECRA) in subsection (vi).
ECRA, along with FIRRMA, were both contained within a larger
legislative work, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA).98 “In Section 1758 of the NDAA,
the ECRA authorized [Department of Commerce] to establish
appropriate controls . . . on the export, re-export, or transfer (in
country) of (1) emerging and (2) foundational technologies.”99 Apart
from identifying these “emerging and foundational technologies,” the
ERCA simultaneously required that the deliberation process also
97. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(6)(A), 132 Stat. at
2181–82 (emphasis added).
98. See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018); Farhad Jalinous et al., Congress Finalizes CFIUS and Export
Control Reform Legislation, WHITE & CASE (July 26, 2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/congress-finalizes-cfius-and-export-controlreform-legislation.
99. Richard Burke et al., Department of Commerce Review of Export Controls on Emerging
Technologies, WHITE & CASE (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/department-commerce-review-export-controlsemerging-technologies.
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consider “[t]he development of emerging and foundational
technologies in foreign countries; [t]he effect export controls may
have on the development of such technologies in the United States;
and [t]he effectiveness of export controls on limiting the proliferation
of emerging and foundational technologies in foreign countries.”100
Arguably, this description of emerging and foundation
technologies provides little to no more help than the definition
contained within the text of FIRRMA when trying to understand
exactly what the term “critical technologies” means. However, on
November 19, 2018, the Bureau of Industry and Security published an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“November ANPRM”) in the
Federal Register that provided a proposed list of “representative
technology categories” that would fall under CFIUS as “critical
technologies.”101 Those categories include:
(1) Biotechnology, such as:
(i) Nanobiology;
(ii) Synthetic biology;
(iv) Genomic and genetic engineering; or
(v) Neurotech.
(2) Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technology,
such as:
(i) Neural networks and deep learning (e.g., brain modelling,
time series prediction, classification);
(ii) Evolution and genetic computation (e.g., genetic
algorithms, genetic programming);
(iii) Reinforcement learning;
(iv) Computer vision (e.g., object recognition, image
understanding);
(v) Expert systems (e.g., decision support systems, teaching
systems);
(vi) Speech and audio processing (e.g., speech recognition
and production);
(vii) Natural language processing (e.g., machine translation);
(viii) Planning (e.g., scheduling, game playing);
(ix) Audio and video manipulation technologies (e.g., voice
cloning, deepfakes);
100. Id.
101. Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201, 58,202
(Nov. 19, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744).
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(x) AI cloud technologies; or
(xi) AI chipsets.
(3) Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technology.
(4) Microprocessor technology, such as:
(i) Systems-on-Chip (SoC); or
(ii) Stacked Memory on Chip.
(5) Advanced computing technology, such as:
(i) Memory-centric logic.
(6) Data analytics technology, such as:
(i) Visualization;
(ii) Automated analysis algorithms; or
(iii) Context-aware computing.
(7) Quantum information and sensing technology, such as
(i) Quantum computing;
(ii) Quantum encryption; or
(iii) Quantum sensing.
(8) Logistics technology, such as:
(i) Mobile electric power;
(ii) Modeling and simulation;
(iii) Total asset visibility; or
(iv) Distribution-based Logistics Systems (DBLS).
(9) Additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing);
(10) Robotics such as:
(i) Micro-drone and micro-robotic systems;
(ii) Swarming technology;
(iii) Self-assembling robots;
(iv) Molecular robotics;
(v) Robot compliers; or
(vi) Smart Dust.
(11) Brain-computer interfaces, such as
(i) Neural-controlled interfaces;
(ii) Mind-machine interfaces;
(iii) Direct neural interfaces; or
(iv) Brain-machine interfaces.
(12) Hypersonics, such as:
(i) Flight control algorithms;
(ii) Propulsion technologies;
(iii) Thermal protection systems; or
(iv) Specialized materials (for structures, sensors, etc.).

1005
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(13) Advanced Materials, such as:
(i) Adaptive camouflage;
(ii) Functional textiles (e.g., advanced fiber and fabric
technology); or
(iii) Biomaterials.
(14) Advanced surveillance technologies, such as: Faceprint and
voiceprint technologies.102
Following the publication of the November ANPRM, the “critical
technologies” category experienced a shift from what was once an
unclear and theoretical concept that left prospective investors
scratching their heads to now a comprehensively defined list
consisting of several of the most cutting-edge scientific investment
opportunities. The November ANPRM, however, was conscious of
the list’s potential chilling effect on foreign investment, stating that
“[r]esponses to this ANPRM will help [the Department of] Commerce
and other agencies identify and assess emerging technologies for the
purposes of updating the export control lists without impairing
national security or hampering the ability of the U.S. commercial
sector to keep pace with international advances in emerging fields.”103
Even more troubling than the potentially vast CFIUS coverage
stemming from FIRRMA was the fact that the Committee’s operations
and review still remained secretive, conducted behind closed doors.
There is no case law or open hearing process that provides prospective
foreign investors with a benchmark to determine whether their
investments will be covered by the Committee. All that is made public
are the select transactions that are publicly announced to be under the
Committee’s review and the news of the subsequent decision that
accompanies the CFIUS investigation. While it is safe to say most
transactions being reviewed by the Committee will not be nearly as
colossal as this one, easily the most notable transaction scrutinized by
CFIUS following FIRRMA’s passing was Broadcom’s attempted
$117 billion acquisition of Qualcomm.104

102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See Peter Henderson, President Trump Halts Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, REUTERS
(Mar. 12, 2018, 6:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcommerger/president-trump-halts-broadcom-takeover-of-qualcomm-idUSKCN1GO1Q4.
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a. The Broadcom-Qualcomm saga: A tale of two microchip giants
President Trump’s opinion of Broadcom was not always one of
suspicion. In November 2017, President Trump praised Broadcom as
“one of the really, great, great companies” after CEO Hock Tan
announced Broadcom’s plan to relocate its legal headquarters out of
Singapore and into the United States for tax purposes.105 Friendlier tax
rates, however, was not the only reason for this move; only a few days
later, “Mr. Tan announced that his company had offered to buy another
major chip maker, Qualcomm, for $105 billion, in what would be the
biggest takeover in the history of the technology industry.”106
Qualcomm, based in San Diego, California, is a technology giant,
manufacturing digital wireless communication devices.107 Having
traditionally relied on a mixture of both microchip sales and patent
licensing to garner profits, “the latest plan show[ed] Qualcomm
leaning heavily on its chip side for future growth.”108 More
specifically, Qualcomm is a “leading company in so-called 5G
technology development and standard setting,” competing closely
with China’s Huawei Technologies Co.109 As a leader in American 5G
communications research, the Committee was immediately alerted by
Broadcom’s announcement, fearing that “Broadcom would starve
Qualcomm of research dollars that would allow it to compete.”110
CFIUS’s investigation was also the result of U.S military concerns
regarding Broadcom’s relationship with “third party foreign entities,”
less cryptically known as Huawei.111 In the U.S. military’s opinion, if
Broadcom’s acquisition of Qualcomm was successful, “within 10
years, ‘there would essentially be a dominant player in all of these
technologies and that’s essentially Huawei, and then the American

105. Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Targets Qualcomm in Largest-Ever Tech Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/business/dealbook/broadcomqualcomm-merger.html.
106. Id.
107. QUALCOMM Inc (QCOM US Equity), BLOOMBERG L.,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/ticker/QCOM%20US%20Equity (last visited Apr. 5,
2020).
108. Dan Gallagher, Qualcomm Stacks All Its Chips on 5G, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:49
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-stacks-all-its-chips-on-5g11574261397?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4.
109. Henderson, supra note 104.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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carriers would have no choice. They would just have to buy Huawei
(equipment).’”112
By CFIUS stepping in to intervene and prevent Broadcom’s bid
on the basis of national security, the Committee safeguarded
Qualcomm’s sizable market share of the 5G global market and
preserved Qualcomm’s control of its essential 5G patents
(approximately 15 percent of the world’s essential 5G patents).113 That
being said, Huawei remains the major 5G force in China, which is
expected to become the world’s leading 5G market, amassing an
estimated one-third of all 5G network users.114 Apart from firmly
holding the market in China, Huawei has also increased its
commercial market-share in “several lucrative markets, including
countries that are longstanding U.S. allies.”115 With all that in mind,
the decision to halt and review this transaction was based upon the
relatively obvious implications of the purchase and its likely effect on
U.S. national security.116 President Trump’s decision to block
Broadcom’s bid for Qualcomm revealed a rare moment in his
administration receiving praise on both sides of the political aisle;
“Senator Chuck Schumer, the top Democrat in the U.S. Senate, praised
Trump’s decision, calling China’s trade practices ‘rapacious.’”117
While much can be learned from Broadcom’s attempted
acquisition of Qualcomm, it still leaves much to the imagination for
foreign investors, especially considering that the vast majority of
foreign investment into U.S. “critical technologies” will be noticeably
smaller than what would have literally been the largest technology
merger of all time.118 And despite the list provided from the November
ANPRM, investors will often have to simply wait and see if their
investment into these emerging technologies flags the interest of the
112. Id.
113. Eric Auchard & Stephen Nellis, What Is 5G and Who Are the Major Players?, REUTERS
(Mar. 15, 2018, 4:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-5g/whatis-5g-and-who-are-the-major-players-idUSKCN1GR1IN.
114. Id.
115. Eric Auchard & Sijia Jiang, China’s Huawei Set to Lead Global Charge to 5G Networks,
REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5gchina/chinas-huawei-set-to-lead-global-charge-to-5g-networks-idUSKCN1G70MV.
116. Id.
117. Shravanth Vijayakumar et al., Timeline: Broadcom-Qualcom Saga Comes to an Abrupt
End, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-abroadcom-timeline/timeline-broadcom-qualcomm-saga-comes-to-an-abrupt-endidUSKCN1GQ22N.
118. See de la Merced, supra note 105.
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executive branch or the Committee. According to the Rhodium Group,
an independent research provider specializing in economic data and
policy insights, “15-25% of Chinese venture deals will be reviewable
under the new regime, but if a broad definition is adopted, that could
rise to 75% of deals.”119
On the other hand, Silicon Valley startups receiving foreign
Chinese investments have also begun to grow wary of the once
welcomed Chinese financial backing.120 Previously, entrepreneurs
welcomed Chinese money as the Chinese investors often agreed to
higher valuations in exchange for access to the deal.121 Occasionally,
startup entrepreneurs were not even aware of the fact that their capital
came from Chinese investors “because China’s sovereign, provincial
and local governments, state-owned enterprises, firms and individual
investors often form their own funds and pool their money in each
other’s investment vehicles,” all under the guise of Western-sounding
names, such as Westlake Ventures.122 As a result, those startups that
continued to accept more Chinese backing have recently begun to feel
the pressure resulting from the ever-escalating tech-arms race between
the United States and China. One entrepreneur recently commented on
the impact of unknowingly accepting Chinese money from Danhau
Capital, a Chinese venture-capital firm based near Stanford
University: “You’re going in blind. If there are issues down the line
you may not know who you’re dealing with.”123 But despite all this,
foreign investment, specifically from China, continues to provide
capital, albeit at a declining rate, for numerous smaller, minority
investments into new startups still focused on what has clearly now
been defined as “critical technologies” pursuant to the November
ANPRM.124
Regardless of its size, it is safe to say that if any lesson is learned
from the Broadcom-Qualcomm saga, it is this: any major investment
119. Silicon Valley Gets Queasy About Chinese Money, ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/09/silicon-valley-gets-queasy-about-chinesemoney.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Burke et al., supra note 99; see also Thilo Hanemann et al., Net Negative: Chinese
Investment in the US in 2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 13, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/chineseinvestment-in-the-us-2018-recap/ (describing a noticeable lowering in Chinese investment into tech
startups following the passing of FIRRMA).
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that will likely give China, or nations closely associated with China,
an upper hand on what the U.S. military finds vital to national security
will most certainly catch the Committee’s attention and likely be
blocked. What lingers is discovering what that means for American
startups in the future. How broadly will “critical technologies” be
defined and applied by CFIUS? Will the Chinese continue to invest,
but more selectively? If not, where else will that money go, possibly
marking the beginning of a new Silicon Valley far from American
shores? This balance of both encouraging investment into the U.S.
tech-economy and simultaneously rejecting certain investments
deemed problematic by CFIUS will likely have FIRRMA’s desired
effect: blocking Chinese investments that pose a threat to U.S. national
security. But the long-term consequences of FIRRMA may likely
extend beyond its initial purpose.
3. “Sensitive Personal Data”
Third and most ambiguous of the newly included FIRRMA
categories concerns the “sensitive personal data” of all Americans.125
Unlike other amendments to CFIUS’s review scope, neither “sensitive
personal data,” nor any variation of the term, has ever been referenced
by CFIUS standards before, essentially equating this term to unknown
territory for foreign investors. This text was added late in the
legislative process following the House’s request for its inclusion, so
naturally, absolutely no formal definition was provided for what
actually constitutes “sensitive personal data.”126 As a primer to inform
investors on what it could mean, the Treasury Department did provide
this description:
Sensitive personal data: CFIUS may review transactions
related to U.S. businesses that maintain or collect sensitive
personal data of U.S. citizens that may be exploited in a
manner that threatens national security. “Sensitive personal
data” is defined to include ten categories of data maintained
or collected by U.S. businesses that (i) target or tailor
products or services to sensitive populations, including U.S.
125. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §
1703(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III), 132 Stat. 1636, 2177–78.
126. David R. Hanke, CFIUS 2.0: ‘Sensitive Personal Data’ in the National Security Context,
ARENT FOX LLP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/cfius-20-sensitivepersonal-data-national-security-context.
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military members and employees of federal agencies
involved in national security, (ii) collect or maintain such
data on at least one million individuals, or (iii) have a
demonstrated business objective to maintain or collect such
data on greater than one million individuals and such data is
an integrated part of the U.S. business’s primary products or
services. The categories of data include types of financial,
geolocation, and health data, among others. Genetic
information is also included in the definition regardless of
whether it meets (i), (ii), or (iii).127
Despite the Treasury Department’s attempt to resolve initial
questions regarding the meaning of “sensitive personal data” and, of
course, to be consistent with “critical infrastructure” and “critical
technologies,” “sensitive personal data” is seemingly as vast a term as
those interpreting it are willing to go. It should be noted, however, that
FIRRMA’s use of “sensitive personal data” does depart from the more
standard term “personally identifiable information,” and many believe
that this was a deliberate move, viewing “sensitive personal data” as
another means to further extend the Committee’s reviewing scope.128
While the two likely have some overlap, drawing the distinguishing
line will likely be challenging for foreign investors. “Sensitive
personal data” may include “personally identifiable information,”
such as one’s social security number or educational history, but the
former may also cover information that has traditionally not been
associated with “personally identifiable information,” such as an
individual’s biometric information or internet history and social media
data.129 Ultimately, what’s most troubling about this category is that
there simply are no supplemental materials, other than the Treasury
Department’s statement, that provide any basis on how CFIUS will
interpret this section of FIRRMA or enforce it. Accordingly, foreign
investors are left with two options: either wait for further instructions
on exactly which types of transactions are likely to be flagged under
FIRRMA or continue on ahead, risking that their investment might be
terminated by the Committee.130
127. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 87, at 3.
128. Hanke, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. This Note does not address the Treasury Department’s final two regulations regarding the
implementation of FIRRMA and the Committee’s reviewing power. These regulations were
introduced immediately prior to the publication of this Note and, accordingly, the author was unable
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IV. THE OBSCURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS UNDER FIRRMA
At its outset, this Note analyzed CFIUS’s legislative history and
examined the jurisdictional implications that FIRRMA would have on
the Committee, but the most important, and yet unresolved, question
is whether this Act will truly assist in furthering the legislative goal of
FIRRMA: enhancing protection of U.S. national security interests. In
addressing this issue, however, the question must be broken into two
parts: how will FIRRMA impact U.S. national security in the short
term and in the long term?
As far as the short-term effects of FIRRMA go, there are certain
benefits to CFIUS’s ability to reject certain mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers that it finds issue with, assuming it has the bandwidth and
personnel needed to review all the transactions it desires. Years of
international relations or national security experience are not
necessary to generally understand the potential implications that the
Broadcom-Qualcomm acquisition could have posed to U.S. national
security, but transactions of this magnitude are obvious and
conspicuous.
The Achilles’s heel of FIRRMA, however, is embedded within
its long-term effect: if broad definitions of “critical infrastructure,”
“critical technologies,” and especially “sensitive personal data” are
adopted by the Committee resulting in more and more blocked foreign
investments, investors will simply go elsewhere. And as a result, the
likely departure of U.S. technological innovation to distant shores may
ultimately endanger U.S. national security interests to an even greater
extent than the investments FIRRMA was designed to block.131
Despite Silicon Valley being the uncontested leader in the tech
world, other regions are rising to the challenge. “Of 63 private
companies reaching ‘unicorn’ valuations of $1B+ [during 2018], 38—
or nearly two-thirds—of them came from outside the US.”132 From
January 2012 to May 2018, Silicon Valley received $140 billion in
to provide a full analysis of these newly presented regulations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, Treasury Releases Final Regulations to Reform National Security Reviews for Certain
Foreign Investments and Other Transactions in the United States (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm872.
131. Steve Croley et al., How FIRRMA Changes the Game for Tech Cos. and Investors,
LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090123/how-firrmachanges-the-game-for-tech-cos-and-investors.
132. Marcelo Ballvé, Silicon Valley’s Competition, CBINSIGHTS (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/silicon-valleys-competition/ (emphasis added).
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fundraising for tech startups, but Beijing and Shanghai received a
combined $95 billion.133 Despite Silicon Valley being the reigning
champion of the global tech-economy, Asia’s rise is undeniable as it
becomes the focus of early-stage startups entering the market,
consistently receiving substantial dollar investments with most of this
funding and growth being allocated to Chinese startups.134
Not only does Asia have the technological know-how to assist
and foster these companies, but there are often other “nuts and bolts”
factors that make operating out of Asian markets more feasible for
fledgling tech-companies, most notably real estate.135 When it comes
to deciding between housing in either Silicon Valley or Beijing,
Beijing’s economic advantage is irrefutable. Given that the medium
price for a home in the San Francisco Bay Area is a staggering
$940,000, Ajay Royan of investment fund Mithril Capital put it best:
“How are you supposed to have a startup in a garage if the garage costs
millions of dollars?”136
CFIUS, with all of its amendments expanding its reviewing scope
since its original enactment in 1975, has always been reactionary,
following unanticipated shifts in the economy and national security.
For four and a half decades, CFIUS has been playing a never-ending
game of catch up with whatever it perceives as a threat to U.S. national
security interests. But despite its best efforts and good intentions,
FIRRMA may have gone too far. In an attempt to halt China’s everincreasing investments into emerging technologies in the United
States, FIRRMA may currently be viewed as a shield protecting
against such investments but is likely to manifest itself as a doubleedged sword. While FIRRMA will undoubtedly fend off investments
that are likely accompanied by suspicious Chinese motives, at the
same time it is also likely to divert future funding for America’s techeconomy and, in an ironic twist, send prized future innovation to the
very shores it was designed to withhold that technology from. The
only entity that can truly determine the Committee’s fate is the
Committee itself, especially regarding its decision as to how exactly
133. Global Tech Hubs, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/globaltech-hubs/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
134. Id.
135. See Silicon Valley Is Changing, and Its Lead Over Other Tech Hubs Narrowing,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/09/01/silicon-valley-ischanging-and-its-lead-over-other-tech-hubs-narrowing.
136. Id.
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“critical infrastructure,” “critical technologies,” and “sensitive
personal data” will be defined. After all, the interpretation of these
terms will determine the jurisdictional scope of the Committee going
forward, and subsequently, affect the willingness of foreign investors
to enter U.S. markets. In the end, as the old saying goes, only time will
tell.

